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CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS’S INDIVIDUAL 
MANDATE: THE LAWLESS MEDICINE OF NFIB 
V. SEBELIUS 
Gregory P. Magarian* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sebelius1 (NFIB) shocked the legal world. Many observers 
predicted the decision’s central holding: that Congress in the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act2 (PPACA) had proper constitutional 
authority to impose the Act’s “individual mandate,” which requires that all 
Americans purchase health insurance if they can afford it. Almost everyone 
expected the Court’s four more liberal Justices to vote to uphold the Act 
and at least three of the Court’s conservatives to vote to strike most or all of 
it down. Chief Justice Roberts’s lead opinion, however, produced a cascade 
of surprises. The conservative Chief Justice joined the Court’s liberals in 
upholding the individual mandate; he reached that conclusion based on 
Congress’s taxing power, rather than its powers under the Commerce 
Clause or the Necessary and Proper Clause; he nonetheless declaimed at 
length about how those other powers did not support the mandate; and he 
struck down a key element in the Act’s expansion of Medicaid. Meanwhile, 
the Court’s four other conservative Justices filed a jointly authored dissent 
that conspicuously failed to endorse even those aspects of the Chief 
Justice’s opinion on which all five conservatives agreed, while two of the 
Court’s liberals—Justices Breyer and Kagan—joined the Chief Justice, 
without comment, in weakening the Medicaid expansion. 
Chief Justice Roberts’s leadership in upholding the individual mandate 
left conservatives fuming, liberals beaming, and commentators falling over 
one another to praise the Chief Justice’s courage, resistance to partisanship, 
and embrace of judicial restraint. “For bringing the Court back from the 
partisan abyss,” wrote Jeffrey Rosen in a representative paean, “Roberts 
deserves praise not only from liberals but from all Americans who believe 
 
*
  Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis. Thanks to Charles Burson, Tiffany 
Graham, John Inazu, Bryan Lammon, and Adam Rosenzweig for helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
1
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that it’s important for the Court to stand for something larger than politics.”3 
Echoed Linda Greenhouse: “[The Chief Justice] spoke for the country. His 
decision . . . saved the Supreme Court from the stench of extreme 
partisanship that has hung over the health care litigation . . . .”4 Harvard 
Law School Dean Martha Minow wrote that Chief Justice Roberts’s 
opinion served to “revive respect for the judiciary” at a politically divisive 
moment by “signal[ing] a commitment to separating the judiciary from 
politics in method, tone, and results.”5 
This Essay challenges that heroic narrative. Chief Justice Roberts’s 
legal analysis in NFIB runs from inadequate to improper, leaving the nation 
with a profoundly lawless resolution of a singularly important legal 
controversy. I share the prevalent assumption that the Chief Justice voted to 
uphold the individual mandate out of a deeply held concern for the Court’s 
institutional reputation. I also agree with most of the Chief Justice’s 
cheerleaders that the PPACA is both a constitutionally proper enactment 
and good (though in my view not nearly optimal) public policy. Even so, I 
believe the Chief Justice’s idiosyncratic resolution of NFIB—his own 
individual mandate—will do the Court, and the nation, far more harm than 
good. To call a judicial opinion “lawless” can mean two things: either the 
opinion literally contains no law, which leaves it lawless in what I will call 
a descriptive sense; or it reflects an active contempt for law as properly 
understood, which makes it lawless in what I will call a normative sense. 
The Chief Justice’s opinion manages to exemplify both senses of 
lawlessness, failing to provide sufficient legal justification for any of his 
major conclusions while violating fundamental norms of constitutional 
judicial review. 
I. THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE ANALYSIS: BURNING THE STATUTE IN 
ORDER TO SAVE IT 
The most prominent target of the legal challenge to the PPACA, the 
individual mandate, requires people who can afford insurance to purchase it 
or else pay a penalty to the federal government.6 The government posited 
three alternative sources of constitutional authority for the mandate: the 
power to regulate interstate commerce;7 the Necessary and Proper Clause,8 
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as an adjunct to the commerce power; and, based on the penalty option, the 
taxing power.9 Chief Justice Roberts, in a portion of his opinion joined by 
no other Justice, but echoed by the four joint dissenters (Justices Scalia, 
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito), thoroughly and emphatically rejected the 
government’s reliance on the commerce power and the Necessary and 
Proper Clause. This portion of the Chief Justice’s opinion indulges in 
needless constitutional analysis while creating no legally binding precedent. 
As such, it is both normatively and descriptively lawless. Then, in the most 
practically significant portion of his opinion, the Chief Justice wrote for a 
54 majority (joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan) 
in upholding the mandate under the taxing power. This portion of the 
opinion relies on two crucial legal premises that it fails to defend, rendering 
it descriptively lawless. 
A. Advice We Don’t Need 
The PPACA’s individual mandate is a novel provision in federal law. 
Never before has the federal government required citizens to purchase a 
good in the private marketplace.10 The Act maintains our health care 
system’s reliance on private insurance, but it imposes several new 
regulatory constraints on private insurers.11 The individual mandate offsets 
these requirements by forcing lower risk people into the insurance pool, 
requiring everyone to purchase private insurance or pay a penalty to the 
government. The government in NFIB primarily defended the mandate on 
the ground that it directly regulated the interstate market in medical 
insurance. In the alternative, the government argued that the remainder of 
the PPACA properly regulated interstate commerce—a premise no one 
seriously disputes—and the mandate was a necessary and proper measure to 
effectuate that regulation. 
Chief Justice Roberts spends fifteen pages of his opinion refuting these 
contentions.12 The Chief Justice begins by adding to the Court’s Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence a novel distinction between regulation of commercial 
action and regulation of commercial “inaction.”13 He rejects the commerce 
power as a basis for the individual mandate because the mandate “does not 
regulate existing commercial activity [but] instead compels individuals to 
 
9
  Id. cl. 1. 
10
  See Nan D. Hunter, Health Insurance Reform and Intimations of Citizenship, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 
1955, 1977 (2011) (“There seems to be little dispute that this precise form of federal mandate—that 
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  See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg (Supp. V 2012) (“community-rating” provision); Id. §§ 300gg-1, -3, -4(a) 
(“guaranteed-issue” provision). 
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  See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585–93 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, 
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become active in commerce by purchasing a product . . . .”14 Validating the 
mandate as a Commerce Clause regulation “would justify a mandatory 
purchase to solve almost any problem”15 and, more broadly, would 
“permit[] Congress to reach beyond the natural extent of its 
authority . . . .”16 The Chief Justice dismisses the government’s claim that 
the uninsured affect the health care market because they will inevitably use 
health care services: “[W]e have never permitted Congress to anticipate . . . 
[commercial activity] in order to regulate individuals not currently engaged 
in commerce.”17 
The Chief Justice’s rejection of the Commerce Clause theory sets up 
his rejection of the government’s alternative theory that the Necessary and 
Proper Clause authorizes the individual mandate. He maintains that letting 
Congress regulate commercial inactivity in the service of the power to 
regulate actual commerce would “vest[] Congress with the extraordinary 
ability to create the necessary predicate to the exercise of an enumerated 
power.”18 Thus, while Congress may have considered the mandate 
“necessary” for effectuating its Commerce Clause authority to regulate the 
interstate market in health care services, the Chief Justice finds that the 
mandate was not a “proper” means of doing so.19 The joint dissent echoes 
and elaborates the Chief Justice’s conclusions about the commerce power 
and the Necessary and Proper Clause,20 but none of the joint dissenters join 
any part of his opinion. Justice Ginsburg’s separate opinion, in contrast, 
lacerates Chief Justice Roberts’s analyses of the Commerce Clause and the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.21 
Perhaps the individual mandate’s distinctive requirements will limit the 
significance of the Chief Justice’s analysis for future challenges to federal 
programs. Nonetheless, his restrictive analysis takes by far the Court’s most 
aggressive posture against federal power since the Justices struck down core 
elements of the New Deal seventy-five years ago.22 The Chief Justice’s 
action–inaction distinction has the potential to undermine any federal 
mandate that requires regulated entities to take new actions.23 In addition, as 
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  Id. at 2588. 
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  Id. at 2589. 
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  Id. at 2590. 
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  Id. at 2592. 
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  See id. 
20
  See id. at 2644–50 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
21
  See id. at 2615–29 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and 
dissenting in part). 
22
  See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (striking down the Bituminous Coal 
Conservation Act as exceeding congressional authority under the Commerce Clause). 
23
  Indeed, the Chief Justice suggests that federal commands to act may only survive constitutional 
review if grounded in “constitutional provisions other than the Commerce Clause.” NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 
2586 n.3 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). 
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Justice Ginsburg points out, both the Chief Justice and the joint dissent 
appear to harbor within their federal power arguments an economic 
substantive due process theory, under which the mandate really offends the 
Constitution by undermining economic liberty.24 Chief Justice Roberts, 
channeling widespread political anxiety about the mandate, frets that 
“[a]ccepting the Government’s theory would give Congress . . . license to 
regulate what we do not do, fundamentally changing the relation between 
the citizen and the Federal Government.”25 Taken to its logical extreme, a 
substantive due process analysis of the PPACA could reanimate the 
Lochner era’s constitutionalization of laissez-faire economics.26 
But at present, none of what Justice Ginsburg sharply calls “the Chief 
Justice’s Commerce Clause essay”27 means anything at all for the law. In 
both a descriptive sense and a deeper normative sense, this portion of his 
opinion is profoundly lawless. The Chief Justice’s analysis of the commerce 
power and the Necessary and Proper Clause announces no legal holding of 
the Court. No other Justice joined or concurred in this portion of his 
opinion; it represents the Chief Justice’s solitary view. Why did the four 
joint dissenters, who echo the Chief Justice’s restrictive federal power 
analysis, decline even to concur in his judgment? Presumably because this 
part of the Chief Justice’s opinion announces no judgment in which to 
concur. The commerce power and Necessary and Proper Clause analyses 
are entirely unnecessary to the Chief Justice’s ultimate judgment upholding 
the individual mandate. 
The descriptive absence of law in Chief Justice Roberts’s cramped 
analysis of federal power points toward the sense in which this portion of 
his opinion is also normatively lawless. Why, if the discussion of the 
commerce power and the Necessary and Proper Clause forms no part of the 
Court’s ultimate judgment, does the Chief Justice discuss those issues at 
all? His attempted justification, responding to criticism by Justice 
Ginsburg,28 states that 
the statute reads more naturally as a command to buy insurance than as a tax, 
and I would uphold it as a command if the Constitution allowed it. It is only 
because the Commerce Clause does not authorize such a command that it is 
necessary to reach the taxing power question. And it is only because we have a 
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  See id. at 2623 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and 
dissenting in part). 
25
  Id. at 2589 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). 
26
  See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (finding strong constitutional protection for a right 
to contract). This is not the first time that critics of the Roberts Court’s conservative majority have noted 
echoes of Lochner in its opinions. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2685 (2011) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting) (contending that the majority’s extension of First Amendment protection to commercial 
data mining repeats the error of Lochner). 
27
  NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2629 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and 
dissenting in part). 
28
  See id. at n.12. 
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duty to construe a statute to save it, if fairly possible, that [the individual 
mandate] can be interpreted as a tax. Without deciding the Commerce Clause 
question, I would find no basis to adopt such a saving construction.29 
In essence, the Chief Justice tells us that, when a court considers a 
constitutional challenge to federal authority that the government defends on 
several alternative grounds, the court should first organize the government’s 
justifications along a spectrum from most to least intuitively “natural” and 
then fully analyze and pronounce a legal holding on each of those 
constitutional justifications, in order of “naturalness,” until (a) the court 
finds one of them straightforwardly persuasive or (b) it rejects all 
justifications save the last one. If the court reaches the last justification, it 
should construe the statute if possible to support that justification, leaving 
all its foregoing constitutional pronouncements in place and in force. 
Chief Justice Roberts’s methodology radically departs from well-
established norms of constitutional judicial review. Justice Brandeis, 
concurring in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority,30 offers the classic 
formulation of what we now call the canon of constitutional avoidance. 
Two distinct but related elements of that canon matter for assessing NFIB. 
First, a court that reviews a constitutional challenge to a statute must 
determine whether some independent ground for decision obviates the need 
to decide the constitutional question at all.31 Second, if compelled to address 
the statute’s constitutionality, the court must construe the statute, if 
possible, in a manner that avoids the need to declare the statute 
unconstitutional.32 
The government in NFIB offered three alternative constitutional 
grounds—the Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, and the 
Taxing Clause—as justifications for the individual mandate. In order to 
strike down the mandate, the Court would have had to render a 
constitutional judgment that each of the three alternative grounds failed as a 
basis for congressional authority.33 To uphold the mandate, the Court 
needed only to render a decision that one of the three alternative grounds 
supported the mandate. Upholding the mandate might or might not have 
entailed a sympathetic construction under the second Ashwander principle. 
What the Court had no need to do, under any scenario, was render a 
constitutional judgment about more than one of the three alternative 
 
29
  Id. at 2600–01 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). For a discussion of the Chief Justice’s taxing power 
analysis, see infra Part I.B. 
30
  297 U.S. 288 (1936). 
31
  See id. at 347–48 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
32
  Id. at 348. 
33
  Cf. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that neither the Commerce Clause 
nor the Fourteenth Amendment supported the civil damages provision of the Violence Against Women 
Act). 
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grounds if it found any of those grounds sufficient to support the mandate.34 
But that is exactly what Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion does. He argues, in 
effect, that he needed to eviscerate the first Ashwander command—make no 
unnecessary constitutional decisions—in order to fulfill the second: 
construe a statute, where possible, in a manner that renders it constitutional. 
Never before has a Supreme Court Justice pronounced these two principles, 
articulated by Justice Brandeis as complementary elements in a scheme of 
judicial restraint, mutually exclusive. 
The canon of constitutional avoidance invites the criticism that 
avoidance enables the Court to send a strong signal about a constitutional 
issue without expending the institutional capital to make an actual 
decision.35 We do not want the Court to influence the development of 
constitutional law under cover of a doctrine meant to avert unnecessary 
constitutional decisions.36 Chief Justice Roberts’s analyses of the commerce 
power and the Necessary and Proper Clause manage to double down on the 
canon’s troubling allowance for sub rosa constitutional decisionmaking, 
even as they flout its dictates. The Chief Justice renders a legally 
unnecessary constitutional decision that limits federal power, as a necessary 
predicate—he tells us—for a tenuous saving construction imposed to avoid 
having to render a constitutional decision that limits federal power. From 
the government’s standpoint, this approach yields the worst of both 
constitutional worlds: the Chief Justice explicitly weakens two sources of 
government power on his way in the door and implicitly weakens a third on 
his way out. 
A judge with any commitment to judicial restraint would treat the 
government’s justifications for the mandate not as a sequential obstacle 
course but as analytic elements of a single problem. She might conclude, in 
reasoning through the case, that the commerce power and the Necessary and 
Proper Clause could not sustain the mandate. But if she further concluded 
that the taxing power supported the mandate, the constitutional avoidance 
canon would properly lead her to write an opinion that discussed only that 
outcome-determinative theory. Which theory the judge found most natural 
would make no difference in how the judge wrote her opinion. Likewise, 
the determination to employ a saving construction, if the judge found that 
step necessary to validate the government’s most persuasive theory, would 
 
34
  Courts sometimes state two alternative legal conclusions in support of a result. That sort of 
decision can cause difficulty in identifying which conclusion forms the controlling legal basis for the 
court’s holding. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1037–38 (1983) (discussing the problem of 
determining which of two independent, adequate legal grounds for a lower court decision the Court 
should recognize as controlling). Chief Justice Roberts in NFIB deviates even further from sound 
judicial practice because he announces legal conclusions that have no claim to relevance for his ultimate 
holding. 
35
  See Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 86–88. 
36
  See id. at 88–89 (arguing that rational legislators will treat the tacit constitutional judgments that 
constitutional avoidance entails as authoritative). 
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simply become part of the background analysis that she performed before 
writing. Chief Justice Roberts’s methodology, in contrast, requires a judge 
to show all the work he performs en route to his result, making conclusive 
legal pronouncements about discarded alternative theories. A more 
destructive inversion of constitutional avoidance is hard to imagine. 
This Essay does not object on substantive federalism grounds to Chief 
Justice Roberts’s reasoning in NFIB.37 Rather, my charge of normative 
lawlessness rests entirely on a procedural objection: the Chief Justice did 
not need to write a word about the Commerce Clause or the Necessary and 
Proper Clause in order to reach his legal conclusion. A legal positivist 
might assert that, if the Chief Justice of the United States portrays what he 
writes as legally necessary, then it is legally necessary. But anyone who 
values “a government of laws, and not of men”38 should condemn the flimsy 
pretext under which Chief Justice Roberts in NFIB denigrates congressional 
power. The Chief Justice’s mischief skirts the far edge of the Article III 
command that federal courts may render judgments only about “Cases” and 
“Controversies.”39 His discussion of the commerce power and the Necessary 
and Proper Clause reads very much like an impermissible advisory 
opinion.40 It is advice we don’t need and should disregard. 
 
B. A Tax by Any Other Name 
Having rejected the government’s justifications for the individual 
mandate under the commerce power and the Necessary and Proper Clause, 
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion turns to the mandate’s final hope: 
Congress’s power to impose taxes. The argument that the taxing power 
supports the mandate rests on the PPACA’s allowance that persons whom 
the Act requires to carry private medical insurance may, in lieu of 
purchasing insurance, pay a penalty to the IRS.41 The argument presented a 
 
37
  Elsewhere I have sketched the grounds for a substantive objection. See Gregory P. Magarian, 
Toward Political Safeguards of Self-Determination, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1219, 1224–36 (2001) (critiquing 
conventional justifications for protecting state prerogatives in constitutional law). Other scholars have 
criticized NFIB on this basis. See, e.g., Robin West, Exit Rights: Roberts’ Conception of America in the 
ACA Decision, JURIST F. (July 25, 2012), http://jurist.org/forum/2012/07/robin-west-aca-roberts.php 
(critiquing the Chief Justice’s opinion as validating a strongly individualist, atomistic political 
philosophy).  
38
  John Adams, To the Inhabitants of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay, March 6, 1775, in 
NOVANGLUS, AND MASSACHUSETTENSIS; OR POLITICAL ESSAYS 78, 84 (Boston, Hews & Goss 1819) 
(1775) (emphasis removed). 
39
  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
40
  Cf. Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2006 (1994) (suggesting that 
“statements a judge makes knowing them to have no direct precedential weight, but which she 
nevertheless hopes will be influential . . . in some sense . . . violate[] the rule against advisory 
opinions”). 
41
  See I.R.C. § 5000A(b)(1) (Supp. V 2012). 
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distinctive structural problem. The Anti-Injunction Act (AIA) bars 
taxpayers from challenging the legality of any tax prior to paying the tax.42 
Because the individual mandate does not become effective until 2014, no 
one has yet had to pay a penalty pursuant to the mandate. Accordingly, a 
conclusion by the Court that the mandate amounted to a tax would have 
seemed to require dismissal of the immediate challenges to the mandate, 
subject to reconsideration of the mandate’s validity once someone in 2014 
paid the penalty and sued to recover the payment. 
To most observers’ surprise, the taxing power formed the sole basis for 
Chief Justice Roberts’s decisive vote to uphold the individual mandate and, 
with it, the rest of the PPACA. The Chief Justice’s taxing power discussion 
bifurcates his statutory and constitutional analyses of the mandate. As a 
statutory matter, the Chief Justice emphasizes that the Act clearly identifies 
the mandate as a “penalty.”43 That identification, he explains, authoritatively 
places the mandate outside the protection of the AIA, allowing the Court to 
consider the substantive constitutional challenge immediately.44 As a 
constitutional matter, the Chief Justice construes the mandate as a proper 
enactment under the taxing power. The PPACA’s penalty language, though 
conclusive on the AIA question, does not constrain the Court’s inquiry 
whether, and how, the Constitution authorized Congress to enact the 
mandate.45 Indeed, the Chief Justice notes, the Court in past cases has 
sustained under the taxing power measures not labeled taxes.46 Payments 
pursuant to the individual mandate will raise revenue for the government, 
helping to offset the cost of providing medical services to people who 
refuse to buy insurance. Based on several factors—the payment cannot 
exceed the cost of private medical insurance, the mandate contains no 
scienter requirement, the Act empowers the IRS to collect the payment by 
ordinary means, and the conduct that triggers the payment need not be 
classed as unlawful—the Chief Justice concludes that the Court can fairly 
uphold the mandate under the taxing power.47 
In contrast to Chief Justice Roberts’s analysis of the commerce power 
and the Necessary and Proper Clause, his taxing power analysis makes law, 
insofar as it holds that the Constitution gave Congress the power to enact 
the individual mandate. Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court’s four 
liberal Justices, joined the Chief Justice’s taxing power analysis, providing 
 
42
  I.R.C. § 7421(a) (2006). 
43
  See I.R.C. §§ 5000A(b), (g)(1). 
44
  See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 258284 (2012). 
45
  See id. at 259495; see also Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948) (“The 
question of the constitutionality of action taken by Congress does not depend on recitals of the power 
which it undertakes to exercise.”). 
46
  See id. at 2595. 
47
  See id. at 2595–97. 
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the only outright majority for any aspect of his opinion.48 The legal basis for 
the Chief Justice’s disposition, however, remains elusive. The conclusion 
that the taxing power saves the mandate rests on two critical premises that 
he fails to defend in any substantial way. That absence of legal support 
renders the Chief Justice’s taxing power analysis descriptively lawless. 
First, Chief Justice Roberts posits that Congress in the PPACA waived 
the AIA’s protection by declining to label the individual mandate a tax. 
“The Anti-Injunction Act and the Affordable Care Act,” he explains, “are 
creatures of Congress’s own creation. How they relate to each other is up to 
Congress . . . .”49 When the Court inquires into that relationship, “the best 
evidence of Congress’s intent is the statutory text.”50 Those propositions 
make sense, as far as they go. Congress must have power to waive the 
AIA’s protection explicitly.51 When Congress makes no explicit statement, 
the Court should make a text-based inquiry into Congress’s intent. The 
Chief Justice, however, provides no additional legal grounding for his 
analysis; and beyond those starting points, difficult questions quickly arise. 
Should not the AIA’s purpose of shielding revenue measures from 
premature legal challenges—a purpose that serves both the government’s 
interest in not defending overzealous lawsuits and the judiciary’s interest in 
not adjudicating them—lead the Court to inquire, in determining whether 
Congress intended the AIA to shield a given revenue measure, whether or 
not the measure in effect imposes a tax?52 Even if the Court should not make 
such a substantive inquiry, is any evidence beyond the fact that Congress 
happened to call a measure a tax or a penalty relevant to the AIA inquiry, or 
must Congress recite the word tax to avoid waiving the AIA’s protection? 
The task of determining whether or not the AIA barred the NFIB challenge 
should have prompted thoughtful consideration of these questions. Instead, 
the Chief Justice simply reduces his examination of “Congress’s intent” to a 
 
48
  Justice Ginsburg, writing for herself and Justice Sotomayor, also concurred in the portion of 
Chief Justice Roberts’s judgment that severs the unconstitutional spending condition in the Act’s 
expansion of Medicaid, although she vigorously disputes the underlying constitutional judgment. See id. 
at 2641–42 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). 
For a discussion of the Medicaid expansion, see infra Part II. 
49
  Id. at 2583 (opinion of the Court). 
50
  Id. 
51
  The Chief Justice goes so far as to suggest that Congress may secure the AIA’s protection for any 
measure it labels a tax, even if the Court concludes that the measure is not a tax at all. He supports that 
proposition with a single citation to a ninety-year-old case. See id. (citing Bailey v. George, 259 U.S. 16 
(1922)). The idea that Congress may implicate the Court in a categorical charade would seem to demand 
a more thorough defense, but the Chief Justice shows no interest in scrutinizing a notion that points 
toward the conclusion he wants to reach. 
52
  Cf. Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 740 (1974) (finding, in concluding that the AIA 
barred a pre-enforcement suit against revocation of a tax exemption, “no evidence that [the revocation] 
does not represent a good-faith effort to enforce the technical requirements of the tax laws,” and 
emphasizing that the challenger “has not shown that the [Internal Revenue] Service’s action is without 
an independent basis in the requirements of the [Tax] Code”). 
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robotic word search, follows that approach to his preferred outcome, and 
leaves a void where legal analysis belongs.53 
Second, Chief Justice Roberts concludes, after positing that the Taxing 
Clause authorizes only taxes and not penalties, that the individual mandate 
falls on the proper side of the divide.54 The Court for decades has taken a 
highly lenient posture toward the taxing power, treating any measure that 
raises revenue as a tax.55 But the Chief Justice, startlingly, revives the long-
interred proposition that the Taxing Clause does not empower Congress to 
impose penalties. He even holds up the notorious restrictive analysis of the 
Child Labor Tax Case56 as his exemplar of judicial review under the Taxing 
Clause.57 He does not define the universe of impermissible penalties, but he 
expends considerable energy to establish that the individual mandate is not 
one. The four joint dissenters, in contrast, carry the Chief Justice’s 
indulgence of the taxpenalty distinction all the way home. They insist that 
the Court has never upheld under the taxing power any law that imposes 
“[a] penalty for constitutional purposes,”58 and they argue vigorously that 
the mandate is just such a penalty. 
The Chief Justice’s response to the joint dissenters’ argument boils 
down to a single precedent: United States v. Sotelo,59 which validated a 
penalty for nonpayment of taxes as a nondischargeable tax within the 
meaning of the Bankruptcy Code.60 But Sotelo, as the joint dissenters easily 
respond, did not present an issue about the constitutional authority for any 
congressional enactment.61 In fact, the issue in that case closely resembled 
the AIA question in NFIB, requiring the Court to decide only whether the 
penalty at issue fit within another statutory definition of tax. The Chief 
Justice’s rejoinder—that both Sotelo and NFIB are statutory construction 
 
53
  The joint dissent, which also purports to consider the AIA question, reaches the same conclusion 
as the Chief Justice based on even shallower analysis. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2655–56 (Scalia, 
Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
54
  See id. at 2596–97 (opinion of the Court). 
55
  See Eduardo Moisés Peñalver, Regulatory Taxings, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2182, 2200–04 (2004) 
(describing the wide range of revenue measures that the Court has permitted under the taxing power). 
56
  Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20, 38 (1922) (striking down a 
tax on goods produced by child labor as a penalty not authorized by the taxing power). 
57
  See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2595. 
58
  Id. at 2651 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
59
  436 U.S. 268 (1978). 
60
  See id. at 273–75. The Chief Justice cites other cases that either declined to extend the taxing 
power to measures that Congress labeled taxes or upheld under the taxing power measures that Congress 
did not label taxes. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2594–95. Only in Sotelo, however, did the Court treat as a 
tax what Congress labeled (and the Court acknowledged as) a penalty. 
61
  See id. at 2651 n.5 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting). The joint dissenters 
similarly might have pointed out that another case the Chief Justice cites for the proposition that 
categorical labels should not govern taxing power analysis, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 
(1992), does not involve Congress’s taxing power at all but rather strikes down a state tax under the 
Commerce Clause. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2595. 
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cases62—is either amateurish or disingenuous, and he is no amateur. His 
taxing power analysis strongly suggests a renewed legitimacy for the 
taxpenalty distinction; but he neglects to develop that suggestion into a 
functional legal analysis, while also failing to explain how the supposed 
distinction spares the individual mandate.63 These failings produce 
descriptive lawlessness. 
II. THE MEDICAID EXPANSION ANALYSIS: AN OFFER STATES  
COULDN’T REFUSE? 
The second primary object of the constitutional challenge to the 
PPACA was the Act’s expansion of Medicaid, the longstanding federal 
program that provides medical assistance to the poor. Most significantly, 
the Act makes every person under age sixty-five with an income up to 
133% of the federal poverty level eligible for Medicaid.64 The practical 
complication of the expansion is that Medicaid has always been an exercise 
in “cooperative federalism,” under which the federal government imposes 
broad policy directives, provides the majority of funding, and oversees the 
program, while the states decide on numerous aspects of implementation, 
provide substantial funding, and administer the program.65 To ensure that 
states would effectuate Congress’s changes to Medicaid, the Act contained 
a leverage provision that allowed the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services to withhold up to 100% of Medicaid funding from any state that 
refused to implement the expansion.66 Chief Justice Roberts—joined 
without comment and perhaps opportunistically by Justices Breyer and 
Kagan67 and substantively supported by the four joint dissenters—held this 
condition on federal funding unduly coercive, in violation of Congress’s 
constitutional authority to spend money.68 
 
62
  See id. at n.7. 
63
  For an effort both to justify reviving the tax–penalty distinction and to explain why that 
distinction should not doom the individual mandate, see Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Not the 
Power to Destroy: An Effects Theory of the Tax Power, 98 VA. L. REV. 1195 (2012). Professors Cooter 
and Siegel express strong approval of Chief Justice Roberts’s tax analysis in NFIB, see id. at 1247–52, 
but they deserve credit for trying to fill the analytic holes the Chief Justice left gaping. 
64
  42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (Supp. V 2012). The Act also extends certain minimum 
coverage provisions of Medicaid to the newly eligible beneficiaries. See id. §§ 1396a(k)(1), 1396u-7(b), 
18022(b). 
65
  See Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431, 444–49 (2011) 
(discussing the genesis of Medicaid and the program’s division of authority between the federal 
government and the states). 
66
  See 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (2006). 
67
  Justices Breyer and Kagan’s complicity in this part of the Chief Justice’s opinion might enable 
them to argue credibly in a later case that the Court should resolve the opinion’s ambiguities in a more 
permissive manner for congressional spending conditions. 
68
  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (granting Congress “Power . . . to pay the Debts and provide for 
the . . . general Welfare of the United States”). 
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The Court’s leading decision on the spending power as a regulatory 
lever, South Dakota v. Dole,69 provides what scant authority exists for the 
Chief Justice’s spending power analysis. The Court has long held that the 
spending power allows Congress to achieve, through spending leverage, 
policy outcomes that it might lack power to achieve under the Commerce 
Clause.70 Dole specifies several criteria that Congress must satisfy when 
imposing conditions on grants to states,71 none of which anyone seriously 
accused the PPACA’s Medicaid condition of failing. After making its major 
points, the Dole Court notes in passing “that in some circumstances the 
financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass 
the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’”72 The Dole Court does 
not elaborate on that single sentence. It offers no description of what might 
constitute undue coercion, no indication that Congress has ever crossed the 
line, and no suggestion of what remedy the Constitution might authorize the 
Court to impose if Congress ever did so. 
Chief Justice Roberts’s treatment of the Medicaid expansion dwells on 
the Court’s decisions that bar Congress from “commandeering” state 
institutions to implement federal policy.73 But he does not hold that the 
expansion commandeered the states. The Chief Justice also foregrounds 
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,74 which upheld against charges of undue 
coercion the Social Security Act’s abatement of payroll taxes for employers 
that paid money into federally certified state unemployment programs.75 But 
he understandably rests no conclusions on Steward Machine, whose factual 
context differs markedly from that of NFIB. Instead, the Chief Justice 
parlays the Dole Court’s one-sentence anticoercion dictum into a severe 
constraint on the PPACA’s Medicaid expansion. The Chief Justice calls the 
Act’s allowance for the federal government to withhold all Medicaid 
funding from a state that fails to comply with the Medicaid expansion “a 
gun to the head.”76 He emphasizes the leverage provision’s massive stakes 
for states, citing statistics that federal Medicaid funding accounts for over 
twenty percent of most state budgets.77 The Chief Justice proclaims that the 
 
69
  483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
70
  See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936) (endorsing Alexander Hamilton’s view that 
Section 8’s authorization to spend for the “general welfare” enables regulation beyond the commerce 
power). 
71
  See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207–08. 
72
  Id. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)). 
73
  See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602–03 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, 
C.J.) (discussing Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (barring commandeering of state executive 
branch officials), and New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (barring commandeering of state 
legislatures)). 
74
  301 U.S. 548 (1937). 
75
  See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2603 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). 
76
  Id. at 2604. 
77
  See id. 
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Act’s Medicaid expansion does not, in fact, expand Medicaid. Instead, the 
Act “enlist[s] the States in a new health care program.”78 Congress could 
not possibly have authority to hold federal funding for an existing program 
hostage to ensure implementation of a new program. To remedy this 
coercion, the Chief Justice fully excises the leverage provision from the 
PPACA.79 NFIB leaves the Act’s substantive changes to Medicaid intact, 
but the federal government now lacks any mechanism to ensure that states 
implement them. 
Beyond Chief Justice Roberts’s inflation of a sketchy dictum into a 
pillar of Spending Clause doctrine, his analysis and disposition of the 
Medicaid expansion reflect two critical ambiguities that render his opinion 
on this issue legally incomprehensible, and thus descriptively lawless. First, 
because the Medicaid Act explicitly authorizes Congress to expand or alter 
the program,80 the Chief Justice’s holding depends on his treatment of 
“existing Medicaid” and “new Medicaid” as two separate federal programs. 
But his bifurcation of Medicaid has no basis in law or logic. By the Chief 
Justice’s reasoning, every time the government purports to expand a 
cooperative federalism program beyond its initial scope, it actually creates a 
new program. With critical distance, the problem gets much worse. As 
Justice Ginsburg emphasizes, Congress has in fact substantially changed 
and expanded Medicaid on numerous occasions over the years.81 What 
makes this expansion any different? The Chief Justice can offer no better 
response than his semantic assertion that “[this] Medicaid expansion . . . 
accomplishes a shift in kind, not merely degree.”82 The PPACA also applies 
longstanding Medicaid procedures to the new beneficiaries.83 Does new 
Medicaid somehow incorporate the numerous salient provisions of existing 
Medicaid by reference? What constitutional principles would govern 
congressional prerogatives if a state balked at applying an existing-
Medicaid procedure to a new-Medicaid beneficiary or to a mixture of new 
and preexisting beneficiaries? At a broader level, should we now 
understand the Dole anticoercion dictum as forbidding the government to 
withhold funds from any existing program in order to ensure compliance 
with any new federal requirement? Such a bar would upend the holding of 
Dole that a spending condition must simply relate to some federal project or 
 
78
  Id. at 2606. 
79
  See id. at 2607. 
80
  See 42 U.S.C. § 1304 (2006). 
81
  See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 263132, 263839 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the 
judgment in part, and dissenting in part). 
82
  Id. at 2605 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). 
83
  See id. at 2635 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and 
dissenting in part). 
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program.84 The Chief Justice’s failure to provide any grounding for his 
cleavage of Medicaid suggests that its only justification is convenience. 
Second, Chief Justice Roberts’s reasoning about coercion and 
disposition of the Act’s leverage provision may—or may not—suffer from 
a crucial disconnect. The Chief Justice emphasizes that Congress should not 
be able to withhold all of a state’s funding under a government program in 
order to encourage a state’s compliance with a federal policy, especially 
when the funding amounts to a large portion of the state’s overall 
revenues.85 Although that argument has only the barest basis in precedent 
and rests on the dubious premise that states may credibly claim detrimental 
reliance on federal funds, it at least makes a comprehensible claim. But the 
Chief Justice proceeds to hold that Congress may not withhold any of a 
state’s Medicaid funding to ensure compliance with the PPACA’s 
expansion.86 That holding may simply reflect the Act’s architecture: striking 
the entire leverage provision may have been the only way for the Court to 
remedy the provision’s excessive, constitutionally impermissible 
possibilities. That remedial explanation, however, ignores the plausible 
alternatives of imposing a limiting construction on the leverage provision or 
waiting to entertain as-applied challenges to actual federal withholding of 
Medicaid funds. The remedial explanation for the Chief Justice’s “all”–
“any” disconnect also soft-pedals his objection to the leverage provision as 
a “retroactive condition[],”87 an objection that suggests he might reject 
federal power to impose even de minimis penalties for states’ 
noncompliance with the expansion. The Chief Justice, however, refuses to 
wrestle or even engage with the question of how much coercion is too 
much: “It is enough for today that wherever that line may be, this statute is 
surely beyond it.”88 
The Dole anticoercion dictum has proved notoriously difficult for 
lower courts to administer, leading many courts and commentators to treat 
the anticoercion principle as nonjusticiable.89 Chief Justice Roberts, in 
giving the dictum serious legal effect for the first time, had a responsibility 
to provide guidance to Congress should it seek to repair or replace the 
PPACA’s leverage provision. May Congress pass a new authorization for 
the Secretary to withhold up to, say, 5% of noncompliant states’ Medicaid 
 
84
  See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–08 (1987). 
85
  See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 260405 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). 
86
  See id. at 2607. 
87
  Id. at 2637 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 25 (1981)). 
88
  Id. at 2606. 
89
  See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting off the Dole: Why the Court Should 
Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND. 
L.J. 459, 485 (2003) (calling the anticoercion principle “at best, ill-suited for judicial administration and, 
at worst, incoherent”). 
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funds? If not, why not?90 The Chief Justice’s failure to provide any legal 
insights as to these essential questions completes his NFIB opinion’s 
catalog of descriptive lawlessness. 
III. THE CHIEF JUSTICE’S INSTITUTIONAL STEWARDSHIP: A 
QUESTIONABLE PLAN, BADLY EXECUTED 
Perhaps my analysis to this point has judged Chief Justice Roberts’s 
opinion in NFIB too harshly by ignoring his complex and noble motives. At 
critical moments in the past, the Supreme Court has compromised its legal 
analysis of constitutional issues in order to defuse potentially explosive 
political conflicts and safeguard the Court’s institutional authority. Two 
prominent examples from the Rehnquist Court are Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey91 and Dickerson v. United States.92 
Each of those decisions reaffirmed a controversial precedent—Roe v. 
Wade93 in Casey; Miranda v. Arizona94 in Dickerson—for which public 
support appeared to have decreased over time. Each decision imposed or 
indulged significant constraints on the challenged precedent, vindicating the 
Court’s institutional authority while simultaneously adjusting to changed 
political norms.95 Both decisions dialed down, to some extent and for some 
years, legal controversy about the precedents at issue. NFIB arguably shares 
key characteristics with Casey and Dickerson. The Court has long promoted 
an expansive vision of federal power; however, a majority of the public, at 
the time the Court handed down NFIB, opposed the PPACA.96 Chief Justice 
 
90
  Sam Bagenstos argues that reading several distinct strands of Chief Justice Roberts’s anticoercion 
rhetoric as conjunctive requirements for a coercion claim might render the Court’s anticoercion holding 
in NFIB manageable. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the Spending Clause 
After NFIB, 101 GEO. L.J. 861 (2013). As with the Chief Justice’s deficient analysis of the taxpenalty 
distinction, see supra note 63, the fact that a top-flight legal scholar can devise reasoning to explain a 
legal opinion does not make the opinion itself legally coherent. 
91
  505 U.S. 833 (1992) (affirming the constitutional right to abortion, upholding some state 
restrictions on abortion, and rejecting others). 
92
  530 U.S. 428 (2000) (affirming the constitutional status of Miranda warnings and striking down a 
federal statute as inconsistent with Miranda). 
93
  410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the Due Process Clause protects a woman’s right to have an 
abortion). 
94
  384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring arresting officers to advise arrestees formally of specific 
constitutional procedural rights). 
95
  See Neal Devins, How Planned Parenthood v. Casey (Pretty Much) Settled the Abortion Wars, 
118 YALE L.J. 1318, 1325–30 (2009) (describing Casey as the Court’s effort to reconcile the right to 
abortion with prevailing public ambivalence about abortion); Donald A. Dripps, Constitutional Theory 
for Criminal Procedure: Dickerson, Miranda, and the Continuing Quest for Broad-but-shallow, 43 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1, 35 (2001) (contending that Dickerson compromised the force of Miranda by 
accommodating “inconsistent and unprincipled” intervening cases that had weakened the Miranda rule). 
96
  See Peter Baker, For Obama, a Signature Issue That the Public Never Embraced Looms Large, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/30/us/politics/health-care-overhaul-is-
still-no-hit-with-public.html (describing the unpopularity of the PPACA and noting polling data shortly 
before NFIB that found public support for the Act at 34%). 
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Roberts’s opinion, by its defenders’ account, manages to vindicate the 
Court’s established constitutional judgment, make reasonable concessions 
to changed public norms, and safeguard the Court’s institutional authority.97 
To the extent Chief Justice Roberts in NFIB abdicated legal analysis in 
order to address political threats to the Court’s institutional interest, his 
opinion embodies lawlessness in the normative sense. Even so, his 
defenders seek to justify that normative lawlessness on institutional 
grounds. I share their premise that constitutional law overlaps substantially 
and inevitably with politics, such that courts cannot and should not bar 
certain political considerations from constitutional adjudication. I also agree 
that the Court has a responsibility to safeguard its institutional authority, 
and my antipathy toward much of the substantive reasoning in Casey and 
Dickerson does not prevent me from viewing those decisions as properly 
having taken public perceptions of the Court’s precedents into account. 
Finally, I agree that the Chief Justice of the United States has a distinctive 
responsibility to guard the Court’s institutional authority, and the notion 
that such an institutional concern substantially motivated Chief Justice 
Roberts’s lead opinion in NFIB seems reasonable. Measured against that 
goal, however, his opinion fails to justify his disregard for legal analysis. 
NFIB differs materially from Casey and Dickerson. Those two 
decisions involved divisive political issues—abortion and coerced 
confessions—that the Supreme Court had recently chosen to 
constitutionalize. Both issues continued to figure prominently in public 
political debates after the Court’s intervention. The Court in Casey and 
Dickerson made or validated politically beneficial concessions on the 
underlying legal issues in order to preserve, at least nominally, the 
challenged precedents’ essential holdings. In contrast, while the federal–
state balance of power has inspired strong political disagreements 
throughout our history, federal courts from the beginning have mediated 
federalism disputes.98 The constitutional law of federal power has stayed 
remarkably stable for the past seventy-five years, with public opposition to 
the Court’s doctrine concentrated in the debased precincts of the Jim Crow 
South. The NFIB Court did not confront the difficult balance between 
adherence to precedent and attention to changed political norms that 
characterize Casey and Dickerson. The Justices merely faced the danger 
that, should they choose to depart from their own precedents by limiting 
federal power, opponents of the result would accuse the Court of judicial 
activism. 
But even if that danger—a perennial occupational hazard of 
constitutional judging—somehow justified the same sort of departure from 
ordinary norms of adjudication seen in Casey and Dickerson, Chief Justice 
 
97
  See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 3 (claiming that “Roberts’ decision was above all an act of judicial 
statesmanship” and that “Roberts chose to place institutional legitimacy front and center”). 
98
  See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
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Roberts’s NFIB opinion would earn low marks for institutional self-
defense. Consideration of three possible varieties of judicial activism 
complaints exposes his failure. 
First, in the difficulty most closely tied to the federalism issues at the 
heart of NFIB, the Court ran the risk of appearing unduly activist for 
broadly moving toward a more restrictive view of federal regulatory power. 
Chief Justice Roberts’s NFIB opinion pours rocket fuel on that fire. 
Although the Chief Justice’s discussion of the commerce power and the 
Necessary and Proper Clause makes no actual law,99 that deficit reflects no 
lack of effort. The Chief Justice, as enthusiastically as the joint dissenters, 
veers far out of his way to craft the “actioninaction” distinction as a brand-
new constraint on the commerce power. His attack on congressional power 
ranges beyond the Commerce Clause to the Necessary and Proper Clause, 
the spending power, and—given his apparent revival of the taxpenalty 
distinction100—even the taxing power. Analytical deficiencies aside, his 
opinion mounts the most comprehensive assault on federal authority in the 
Court’s history. His one departure from a restrictive reading of federal 
power, upholding the individual mandate under the Taxing Clause, comes 
off as rhetorically halfhearted, legally narrow, and shakily persuasive at 
best.101 Five Justices now stand on record as eager to reopen federalism 
battles long thought settled. Activism accomplished. 
Second, critics might have charged the Court with judicial activism for 
striking down a momentous piece of federal social policy legislation and 
thus transgressing the separation of powers. The Chief Justice’s supposed 
effort to avoid this charge still managed, by excising the funding penalty 
from the Act’s Medicaid expansion, to engineer the Court’s most important 
weakening of a federal statute since the early years of the New Deal.102 
Several conservative governors seized on the Court’s decision as a basis for 
refusing to implement the Medicaid expansion.103 The Congressional 
Budget Office estimates that such recalcitrance will thwart the PPACA 
from delivering insurance to three million people.104 The governors’ 
resistance represents a startling rebellion against congressional action in a 
sphere of undeniably national scope, orchestrated by Chief Justice Roberts. 
The mandate’s survival thus represents only a marginal victory for judicial 
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  See supra notes 27–40 and accompanying text. 
100
  See supra notes 54–63 and accompanying text. 
101
  See supra Part I.B. 
102
  See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
103
  See Manny Fernandez, Perry Declares Texas’ Rejection of Health Care Law “Intrusions,” N.Y. 
TIMES (July 9, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/10/us/politics/perry-says-texas-rejects-health-
law-intrusions.html (discussing several Republican governors’ refusal to participate in the Medicaid 
expansion). 
104
  See Robert Pear, Court’s Ruling May Blunt Reach of the Health Law, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/25/health/policy/3-million-more-may-lack-insurance-due-to-
ruling-study-says.html. 
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deference to Congress, and how substantial is even that marginal victory? 
Judicial restraint ordinarily entails robust deference to elected officials’ 
judgment. In this case, the Chief Justice upheld the individual mandate only 
after savaging Congress’s professed basis for enacting it and wanly 
embracing a narrower justification that the government pressed with little 
enthusiasm. The PPACA remains alive, but it rests on a hollow legal 
foundation. 
Finally, critics might have called the Court activist for voting along 
predictable ideological lines in a politically sensitive case. Here the fanfare 
for Chief Justice Roberts reaches its crescendo: he courageously broke with 
his conservative allies to side with the Court’s liberals!105 But his opinion 
breaks with conservative dogma only in a thin sense, upholding the 
individual mandate on the narrowest available ground while effectively 
gutting the Medicaid expansion and promulgating a manifesto on the evils 
of excessive federal power. The bulk of NFIB, in fact, breaks down along 
familiar lines: only the Chief Justice’s heavily compromised vote to uphold 
the individual mandate and Justices Breyer and Kagan’s inscrutable 
acquiescence in weakening the Medicaid expansion depart from the usual 
partisan script.  
In any event, this third sort of complaint about judicial activism—in 
contrast to the complaints grounded in federalism and the separation of 
powers—deserves far less attention than the Chief Justice’s defenders claim 
he gave it. If a politically polarized public reads the Court’s divisions of 
legal opinion as mirroring the public’s own political divide, so what? 
Principled Justices should ignore the danger of appearing partisan as surely 
as they should resist actual partisan motives. Even if we suppose the Chief 
Justice should vote against his legal convictions in order to counter 
impressions of a partisan divide, how often should he do so, and why did 
NFIB present the right occasion for falling on his sword? Do the Chief 
Justice’s recent opinion for a 5–4 conservative majority that struck down 
the preclearance formula of the Voting Rights Act106 and his dissent from a 
similarly “party-line” 5–4 decision to strike down the Defense of Marriage 
Act107 belie his diplomatic sacrifice in NFIB? Or did the supposed sacrifice 
exacerbate the Court’s partisan divide by providing strategic cover for the 
later, ideologically regular actions? 
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in NFIB ultimately resembles Casey 
and Dickerson far less than it resembles a case in which the Rehnquist 
Court reached a very different sort of accommodation between law and 
politics: Bush v. Gore.108 The comparison may surprise observers who insist 
 
105
  See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text. 
106
  Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, No. 12-96, 2013 WL 3184629, at *4–*18 (U.S. June 25, 2013). 
107
  United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307, 2013 WL 3196928, at *17–*20 (U.S. June 26, 2013) 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
108
  531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
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the Chief Justice’s decision to uphold the individual mandate transcended 
politics; but the contrast between Casey and Dickerson, on one hand, and 
Bush v. Gore, on the other, casts an unflattering light on NFIB. In Casey 
and Dickerson, the Court attempted to fashion legal rules that would both 
accommodate political realities and provide meaningful guidance for future 
cases. In contrast, the Court in Bush v. Gore notoriously announced an 
equal protection holding that bears scant resemblance to prior doctrine, then 
proclaimed that its holding lacked any precedential force.109 The Court 
constructed a Potemkin legal analysis in order to achieve—on the least 
cynical view of its motives—short-term political stability. The Chief 
Justice’s opinion in NFIB uses similar means to achieve a similar end, 
tossing off unsupported or half-formed arguments to defuse immediate 
political concerns about the individual mandate. Ironically, public antipathy 
toward Bush v. Gore probably accounted in large part for whatever 
institutional vulnerability the Court faced in NFIB. How could repeating the 
earlier decision’s mistakes do anything, in the long run, but further erode 
public confidence in the Court? 
A coda: No evaluation of Chief Justice Roberts’s institutional 
stewardship in NFIB should ignore the horrific optics of the Court’s 
performance. In Casey, Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter filed a 
joint majority opinion that placed an unprecedented “centrist” coalition 
behind the Court’s qualified reaffirmation of Roe. In Dickerson, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist rallied a solid majority of the Court behind his qualified 
reaffirmation of Miranda. In sharp contrast with those decisions, most of 
Chief Justice Roberts’s lead opinion in NFIB speaks for him alone, and 
almost all of it appears to reflect his distinctive reasoning. A few cursory 
lines from Justice Ginsburg contain the only words of direct support for the 
Chief Justice’s reasoning that any other Justice committed to paper,110 and 
Justice Ginsburg spends the rest of her sixty-one-page opinion beating him 
bloody. Justices Breyer and Kagan, whose votes to limit the Medicaid 
expansion provide the Chief Justice with his only other alliance across 
ideological lines, spill not a drop of ink in his defense. The Chief Justice’s 
fellow conservatives, whose bizarre joint dissent echoes much of what he 
argues, virtually ignore his opinion and decline to join a line of it. The 
opinion thus imposes on the PPACA the Chief Justice’s own individual 
mandate. Within a few days of the decision, the media was buzzing with 
conflicting accounts and accusations about the Chief Justice’s errant 
behavior during the deliberations and drafting.111 These tales told out of 
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school do nothing to diminish the decision’s legal authority, and they prove 
nothing even at the level of gossip. Even so, they appear to have leaked 
from highly placed sources inside the Court, betraying a climate of 
dysfunction and recrimination.112 No capable defender of the Court’s 
institutional reputation would foster such mayhem, let alone allow the 
public to see it splashed across the headlines. 
CONCLUSION 
In the wake of NFIB v. Sebelius, praise has rained down on Chief 
Justice Roberts for writing the opinion that upholds the PPACA’s 
individual mandate. Whatever one’s view about any of the decision’s 
bottom-line results, the adulation is unwarranted. The Chief Justice’s 
opinion exemplifies lawless judicial decisionmaking, in both the descriptive 
sense of failing to state or justify legal conclusions and the normative sense 
of violating bedrock legal precepts. History will validate the Chief Justice’s 
pivotal role in NFIB only if we ignore his parade of offenses against 
responsible judicial review and cogent legal reasoning. Liberals who rejoice 
that the Chief Justice saved the Act, conservatives who welcome his assault 
on federal power, and centrists who commend him for lifting the Court 
above crass partisanship should all look past his opinion’s rhetoric to its 
brittle and hazardous core. The Chief Justice’s individual mandate in NFIB 
provides an important, troubling model of how the Supreme Court should 
not make decisions. 
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